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1. Introduction
A distinct feature of proportional election systems is the emergence and existence of small parties
(Duverger, 1954). Still, we do not know much about whether, and to what extent, individual
parties, small or large, shape policy. There are simply no suitable methods for estimating the e¤ect
of legislative representation of political parties in proportional election systems.1 In this paper, I
try to ll this methodological gap and estimate how party representation a¤ects immigration policy,
environmental policy and tax policy.
To estimate the causal e¤ect of legislative representation, I use observations that are su¢ ciently
close to seat allocation thresholds, for part of the seat allocation to be considered as good as
random. The identifying assumption is that observations close to either side of a seat threshold
are equal in all respects, except party representation. If this holds, any observed di¤erences in
policy outcomes between observations on opposite sides of a seat threshold can be attributed to the
di¤erences in party representation. The identifying assumption is thus similar in spirit to that in
regression discontinuity design (RDD).2 Although the methodology is intuitively simple, there are
several complex methodical challenges associated with the inherent characteristics of proportional
election systems. This implies that I have to make several deviations, and developments, from
the typical RDD. Several of these methodological developments can be applied to other issues and
questions.
In addition to methodological advances, I also present a set of substantive results. Applying
the method to data from Swedish municipalities, I show that changes in legislative representation
have large and signicant e¤ects on immigration and environmental policy. However, I do not nd
any evidence of legislative representation a¤ecting the municipal tax rate. The results also show
that OLS estimates of party representation e¤ects give misleading results.
Focusing on immigration and environmental policy is natural since the two policy areas seem
to have been central for the emergence of new small parties in Western Europe since the beginning
of the 1980s. Examples of electorally successful anti-immigration parties include Front National
in France, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands,
Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and Vlaams Blok in Belgium. Green parties have been su¢ ciently
successful to gain parliamentary representation in several countries such as Germany, France, Italy,
Sweden and Belgium.
1 Around half of the democracies in the world, including most European countries, have political systems with
proportional representation, or elements of it.
2 See Imbens & Lemieux (2008) for an overview of the RD methodology.
2
Proportionality of the election system has been central for the electoral success of green parties.3
To illustrate this, consider the United States and Germany, which both have strong environmental
movements. In Germany, where the representatives to the national parliament are elected pro-
portionally, the Greens (die Grünen) have been represented in the national parliament after every
election since 1983, commonly winning between 6 and 9 percent of the seats. Between 1998 and 2005
it was also part of the governing coalition. In the US, the Green Party has never been represented
in Congress, and only on a few occasions has it been represented in state legislatures. However,
the US environmental movement is still directly involved in policy formation through, for example,
lobbying and public campaigns.4 Thus, it is not clear whether the parliamentary representation of
German greens gives them a larger inuence on public policy than US greens. This paper will help
me address the question of whether political representation actually gives environmental movements
better possibilities of inuencing policy.
Proportionality of the electoral system has also been central for the emergence and electoral
success of anti-immigration parties.5 Even though it is unclear if, and how, representation of anti-
immigration parties has a¤ected policy, their electoral success is often met by strong public, and
political, reactions. An example of this is that the success of the German NPD, a party very far
to the right, with slogans like "Stop the Invasion by Poles", lead other parties to call for a ban of
NPD. For example, the Bavarian interior minister, Joachim Herrmann, stated that: "If we leave
the NPD to do what it wants until the federal republic is at risk, then we have missed the right
point for a ban". Given that we do not know how, or even if, representation of anti-immigration
parties a¤ects policy, it is unclear if the representation of parties like NPD politicians should be a
concern. This is another question this paper helps to address.
Apart from immigration and environmental policy, I also examine how legislative representation
a¤ects tax policy. The tax rate is a general-interest policy that, unlike immigration and environ-
mental policy, is basically dened on the left-right policy spectrum, which commonly denes how
governing coalitions are formed. This makes for an interesting comparison with the other two
policies and also allows me to relate the results to Petterson-Lidbom (2009) who, using an RDD,
estimates the e¤ect of legislative seat majorities on economic outcomes in Swedish municipalities.
There are few clear theoretical predictions of whether, or how, party representation a¤ects policy
3 Studies specically focusing on the emergence and success of environmental parties include Kitschfelt (1989),
Rohrschneider (1993) and Burchell (2002).
4 For example, the Sierra Club in the US has 1.3 million members.
5 For studies on the emergence and success of anti-immigration parties, see, for example, Jackman & Volpert
(1996), Golder (2003) and Rydgren (2005).
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in proportional election systems. But the assumption that individual parties a¤ect policy is central
in many theoretical models. In models comparing proportional and majoritarian representational
systems, the predicted di¤erences often rest on the assumption that individual parties, representing
minorities or special interests, shape policy outcomes; see for example Persson et al. (2007).
Similarly, the literature on the emergence of new parties over new policy issues, often taking its
starting point in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), frequently rests on the implicit assumption that the
legislative representation of a party will a¤ect policy. This is not obvious, however. Special-
interest parties, such as green parties and anti-immigration parties, are generally not part of the
traditional political establishment and seldom belong to governing coalitions. Furthermore, anti-
immigration parties often meet strong opposition in the public debate from parties taking an
opposite stance. From this perspective, estimating the e¤ect of legislative representation is essential
for understanding policy and party formation under proportional representation.
The scant knowledge about how party representation shapes policy outcomes is due to challeng-
ing methodical problems. Clearly, we expect voter preferences and characteristics to a¤ect both
party representation and policy outcomes. Thus, a positive relationship between the representation
of a green party and stricter environmental regulation does not necessarily mean that the green
party has a causal e¤ect on policy. It might simply be the case that when voters have strong en-
vironmental preferences, and vote for a green party, all parties become more "green". Since only a
subset of covariates that could a¤ect both representation and policy outcomes is easily observable,
or measurable, it is not possible to credibly estimate the e¤ect of party representation by including
a wide set of control variables. A credible estimation requires some exogenous variation in party
representation. Since it is not possible to randomly assign party representation, the remaining
option is to try to nd some part of the party representation that can be considered to be as good
as random.
A common solution to estimating the causal e¤ect of legislative outcomes has been to adopt
a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Common to all previous studies is that they rely on the
assumption that a majority of political power is assigned in a random function close to the threshold
for winning a majority of either the vote share or the seat share. Examples of such studies include
Lee et. al. (2004), Ferreira & Gyorko (2009), Pettersson-Lidbom (2009) and Warren (2008).
However, applying this approach to legislative representation in proportional election systems is
not possible, as individual parties are rarely close to holding a majority of neither the vote share
nor the seat share. This motivates the development of a new methodological framework, in which
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identication of causal e¤ects is based on being close to a threshold for a shift in the seat allocation
instead of the threshold for a majority change.
To test the e¤ect of legislative representation on immigration policy, environmental policy and
tax policy, I use almost 300 Swedish municipalities (local governments). This has several advan-
tages. Parties focusing on these policy areas have been electorally successful in Swedish municipal-
ities. Swedish municipalities also have large opportunities to politically inuence all three policy
areas that I examine. Finally, the municipalities are homogeneous with respect to both the political
system and the institutional framework.
My results show that changes in legislative representation have large and signicant e¤ects
on immigration policy, measured as the number of actively admitted refugee immigrants. The
representation e¤ects closely correspond to how voters perceive the parties. New Democracy, a
party which had a clear and strong anti-immigration position, also has the largest negative e¤ect
on immigration policy, while the party with the strongest pro-immigration position, the Liberal
Party, has the largest positive e¤ect. A one-percentage-point shift in seat shares between these two
parties would lead to the average municipality, which has a population of 30 000, actively admitting
ten more, or less, refugee immigrants per year during a four-year election period.
The results for environmental policy, measured through a survey-based environmental policy
ranking, also show large and statistically signicant e¤ects of changes in legislative representation.
The Environmental Party, with the strongest green prole in Sweden, has a large positive e¤ect
on the ambition level of municipalities environmental policies. As in the case of immigration
policy, the estimated e¤ects of the other parties also correspond to how voters perceive the parties.
The estimated e¤ects suggest that an increase in the seat share of the Environmental Party of
ve percentage points, at the expense of most other parties, could make a municipality undertake
environmental initiatives such as buying "green" energy or carrying out environmental information
campaigns.
The results for tax policy, measured through the municipal tax rate, also follow the voter
perceptions of the parties. The estimated e¤ects are too imprecise to be statistically signicant,
however. Pettersson-Lidbom (2009) nds a large signicant e¤ect on the tax rate from left-wing
parties holding a seat majority, which suggests that legislative majorities, and not individual party
representation, constitute the relevant dimension for primary left-to-right policies such as the tax
rate.
Several mechanisms might potentially explain the representation e¤ects that I uncover. Party
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representation could a¤ect what, and how, coalitions are formed; see for example Austen-Smith
& Banks (1988). The degree of representation could also be decisive for the voting power of a
party; see, for example, Banzhaf (1964) and Holler (1982). The legislative presence of a party could
a¤ect what, and how policies, are discussed in the legislature. Out of these mechanisms, I can only
examine the third. My results show that legislative presence cannot explain the representation
e¤ects.
Section 2 of the paper describes the identication strategy, while Section 3 describes the data
and denes the partiespolicy positions. Section 4 presents the results of the baseline specication.
Section 5 shows results of alternative specications and provides tests of the identifying assumption.
Section 6 covers some extensions to the baseline specication and discusses the mechanisms behind
the results. Finally, Section 7 discusses the ndings and concludes the paper.
2. Identication Strategy
In this section, I rst describe in detail why it is di¢ cult to estimate the policy e¤ects of party
representation in legislatures. Then, I propose a solution to this problem that involves comparing
outcomes in close elections.
Let me introduce some notation that is used throughout the paper. There are P parties indexed
by p = f1; 2; 3; :::; Pg. The number of votes for party p is denoted vp, and the total number of votes
is V =
PP
1 vp. The vector VP = (v1; v2; v3; :::; vP ) contains the votes for all parties. Analogously,
the number of seats of party p is denoted esp, and the total number of seats is S =PP1 esp. The seat
share of party p is denoted sp =
esp
S ; and SP = (s1; s2; s3; :::; sP ) is a vector of the seat shares of all
parties.
For simplicity, I use three parties in all models and examples in this section. This is the simplest
setting that captures the specic characteristics of proportional election systems. Extending the
models and examples to more than three parties is straightforward and does not require any changes
in the model.
Given an allocation of votes, seats are allocated by the function esp = f (VP ; S) based on,
for example, the Sainte-Laguë or the dHondt method. A detailed description of seat allocation
methods in proportional election systems and how to adopt the method developed in this paper to
di¤erent seat allocation methods can be found in the Appendix.
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2.1. Identication problem
I wish to estimate the e¤ect of party representation, dened as the seat shares, SP , of parties,
on some policy, y, in municipality i. Let us assume that I wish to estimate the e¤ect of party
representation with a linear model:
yi = + 1s1i + 2s2i + "i: (2.1)
In this specication with three parties, Party 3, p = 3, is omitted and used as the reference case.
Thus, what I estimate are the e¤ects of Party 1 or Party 2 when their representation increases at
the expense of Party 3.
The identication problem arises because party representation is likely to be correlated with
the error term because voter preferences may directly a¤ect policy, "i = k (VP )+ui, where k (VP )
is an unknown function of the vote shares of the parties. Inserting this error term into the above
equation yields
yi = + 1s1i + 2s2i + k (VP ) + ui: (2.2)
Omitting or misspecifying k (VP ) implies that SPi will be correlated with the error term and the
estimated coe¢ cients in  will be inconsistent.
The e¤ect of voter preferences on policy, described by k (VP ), might arise in many ways. For
example, conservative politicians get a larger seat share in conservative districts. Conservative
districts are di¤erent from less conservative ones in many respects - presumably higher income,
higher education, etc.- and we do not know how to disentangle the policy e¤ects of seat allocations
from these other characteristics. There could also be a direct e¤ect of voting on policy outcomes.
Since voting for a party signals voter preferences to politicians, an increase in votes for a green party
might signal a rise in environmental awareness amongst voters, which a¤ects the environmental
policies pursued by all other parties. A nal problem is that the policy outcome can inuence
voting behavior. A large inow of refugee immigrants could, for example, a¤ect voting on anti-
immigration parties.
To solve this identication problem, I will compare policy outcomes when a party barely received
or did not receive an extra seat. The fundamental identifying assumption is that the marginal seat
is randomly allocated when we are su¢ ciently close to a threshold for a seat change.
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2.2. Seat thresholds, distance and closeness
Before specifying the model to be estimated, we must rst precisely dene seat thresholds, vote
distances to thresholds, and being close to a threshold.
I illustrate these concepts graphically in Figure 1, which shows the allocation of three seats
between three parties in a simplex. Each contiguous region in the simplex represents a specic seat
allocation. This allocation is displayed by three numbers at the center of each region in the simplex.
For example, in the region in the bottom left corner, Party 3 receives all seats, eSP = (0; 0; 3), since
the other parties get too few votes. The seat thresholds are the boundaries between the contiguous
regions, drawn as solid lines. Crossing such a threshold changes the seat allocation. For example,
suppose that we start from the bottom left corner and move right along the "bottom" line of the
simplex, along which Party 2 holds a vote share of zero. Moving along this line, Party 1 will gain
its rst seat when its vote share surpasses 17 percent. This seat was previously held by Party 3.
In other words, the seat allocation changes from eSP = (0; 0; 3) to eSP = (1; 0; 2).
Note that the number of seats of a party is a¤ected by the votes of all parties. Consequently,
the distance to a seat change cannot be measured only using the vote share of an individual party.
For example, the vote share at which Party 1 will receive its rst seat depends on how the remaining
votes are distributed across Party 2 and Party 3. This implies that Party 1 may experience a seat
change while keeping its vote share constant.
I dene the distance between two vote vectors, V0P and V
1
P , as the sum across parties of the
absolute vote di¤erences, measured in vote shares. That is, the distance between V0P and V
1
P is
d
 
V0P ;V
1
P

=
p=PX
p=1
v1p   v0p : (2.3)
I then dene the minimal distance to a seat change for party p: Suppose that the election
outcome is V0P ; and the associated seat allocation to party p is s
0
p = f
 
V0P ; S

: The minimal
distance to a seat change for party p is the minimal distance, d
 
V0P ;V
1
P

; to any point V 1P at
which the seat allocation for party p is di¤erent than at V0P , fp
 
V0P ; S
 6= fp  V1P ; S :
I will dene observations as being close to a threshold if the minimal distance to seat change is
less than a cuto¤ point, denoted by . In Figure 1, close elections for party 1 (dened by  = 5
percentage points) are marked in grey. The large ve percent value is chosen for illustrative reasons.
I use the much smaller  = 0:25 percentage points of the vote share in most empirical specications.
In practice, measuring the minimal distance to a seat change is somewhat complicated. A
precise description of this can be found in the Appendix where I also provide a practical example.
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2.3. Specication
I now return to the specication of the model to be estimated, which will compare outcomes in
elections where a party has barely received an extra seat to elections where it has barely not.
To implement this specication, I need two indicator variables. One variable indicates all
observations where a party is close to a threshold. The other variable indicates whether the party
is close to and above or below such a threshold. This is the treatment variable. Formally, I dene
binary indicator variables for each party, cp, which takes the value of 12 for all observations where
the party is within distance  from a threshold, that is, for observations close to a threshold.6 I
also dene the treatment variables tp; which equal  12 if party p is close to and below a threshold,
1
2 if p is close to and above a threshold, and zero otherwise. Figure 1 illustrates the values of these
variables. The grey shading indicates close elections for Party 1 (c1 = 12). The horizontal stripes
indicate that Party 1 is just above a threshold (t1 = 12), and the vertical stripes indicate that Party
1 is just below (t1 =  12). I normalize this by assuming that the e¤ect of an additional seat depends
on the total number of seats in the legislature and thus, I divide the treatment and control variables
by this number.
The specications I investigate are of the form
yi = + 1
c1i
Si
+ 2
c2i
Si
+ 1
t1i
Si
+ 2
t2i
Si
+ g (VPi) + "i; (2.4)
where g (VPi) is a function of the vote shares of all parties. This specication compares outcomes
when parties are just below or just above a threshold to receive more seats. The fundamental
identifying assumption is that within this range, it is essentially random whether a party receives
a seat, implying that corr( t1iSi ; "i) = corr(
t2i
Si
; "i) = 0.7 Since only observations close to the seat
thresholds are used for identication, the control function, g (VPi), is only needed to reduce residual
variation, not to get consistent estimates.
Note that the e¤ect of a certain party gaining or losing a seat depends on what other party
is on the other side of the threshold. The e¤ect on taxes of a centrist party gaining a seat could
have a di¤erent e¤ect if it gains the seat at the expense of a right-wing party or a left-wing party.
In one case, the e¤ect is centrist   right wing; in the other the e¤ect is centrist   left wing: By
6 The choice of  is a trade-o¤ between precision and internal validity. Decreasing  reduces the number of
identifying observations, thus reducing the precision of the estimated e¤ects. The benet is that decreasing  increases
the certainty that the identifying assumption holds. There is no formal rule for choosing  in this setting, making
the choice of  a call of judgement.
7 Note that cov( t1i
Si
; "i) = E
h 
t1i   t1i
 
1
Si
  1
Si

"i
i
= E
h
E
 
t1i   t1i

"i j Si
 
1
Si
  1
Si
i
= 0 if
E
 
t1i   t1i

"i j Si

= 0; that is if the treatment is uncorrelated with "i for all legislature sizes, Si.
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simultaneously estimating the e¤ect of all parties, this possibility is taken care of.8
I nally discuss issues created by multiple election districts within a legislature. In this case,
e¤ects from multiple districts must be aggregated. This is done by aggregating the treatment
variable, tp, the control variable, cp, and the vote shares VPi, over all districts, N , using the
following specication
yi = + 1
c01i
Si
+ 2
c02i
Si
+ 1
1
Si
e=NX
e=1
t1ie + 2
1
Si
e=NX
e=1
t2ie + g
 
V0Pi

+ "i: (2.5)
The control variable, cpi, is now dened as the absolute value of the aggregated treatment variable:
cpi = abs
 
e=NX
e=1
tpie
!
: (2.6)
This denition of the control variable controls for the fact that neither the size of the treatment
e¤ect, nor the treatment status is random.9 The size of the treatment e¤ect is negatively related
to the size of the legislature. The number of districts has a positive e¤ect on the potential size
of the treatment e¤ect since a party can be close to losing, or gaining, a seat in all districts of
a municipality. Several factors inuence the probability of being close to a threshold. District
magnitude has a positive e¤ect on the probability of being close since it decreases the interval
between seat thresholds. Similarly, the number of districts has a positive e¤ect since a party can
be close to a threshold in either of the districts. Finally, as mentioned above, large parties are more
likely to be close to a threshold when a highest averages method is used to allocate the seats. By
using the absolute value of the treatment variable, I control for both di¤erential probabilities of
being close to a threshold and di¤erences in the size of the treatment e¤ect.
For aggregate vote shares, V0Pi; I use the sum of district vote shares, weighted by the relative
number of seats in the district:
v0p =
e=NX
e=1
vpe
Ve
Se
S
: (2.7)
This weighting is of little importance for the estimated coe¢ cients in the regressions with policy
outcomes. It is primarily used to increase e¢ ciency when the seat shares are dependent variables
(see below).
8 An alternative approach would be to separately estimate the e¤ect of crossing a seat threshold between each pair
of parties. However, in the case of this paper, it would, give the same results as estimating the e¤ect of all parties
simultaneously.
9 In practice, the aggregation of the control variable does a¤ect the results. Dening the control variable as the
sum of close seats for a party over all districts, or as a dummy for being close in one of the districts, gives basically
identical results.
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As previously, the identication is due to the random allocation of seats in close elections. The
identifying assumption is that corr(
Pe=N
e=1 t1e; ") = corr(
Pe=N
e=1 t2e; ") = 0, for all legislature sizes,
Si. If the assumption, corr(t1; "i) = corr(t2; "i) = 0 , holds at the district level, it also holds at
the aggregate level. This is because within the subset of close elections, losing or gaining seats is
uncorrelated across districts for the same legislature.
The approach of aggregating the treatment variable over all districts is similar to that in War-
rens (2008) study of seat-share changes in US state legislatures, except that Warren gives the
treatment variable the values  1 or 1, thus underestimating the treatment e¤ect on the seat share
by a factor of 2.
3. Data Description
In this section of the paper, I provide background information on Swedish municipalities, including
the most important institutional features of the political system. I also describe outcome variables
and political parties. Finally, I show what importance the parties attach to the three examined
policy dimensions and how they position themselves on them.
3.1. Political Institutions of Swedish Municipalities
Swedish politics take place at three geographical levels: the national, the county, with 20 counties,
and the municipal, with 290 municipalities. Municipalities di¤er widely in land area, from 9 to
19 447 square kilometers, and population, from 2 558 to 780 817 inhabitants. The municipalities
have a large freedom in organizing their activities. They have the right to levy income taxes, which
account for roughly two thirds of municipal government income. Day care, education and the care
of elderly and disabled are the most important expenditure posts. Expenditures are, on average,
around 20 percent of GDP.
The municipalities are governed by elected councils. The councils appoint subcommittees that
are responsible for di¤erent policy areas such as education and city planning. The municipalities
have a "quasi parliamentary" system where the heads of the subcommittees are appointed by the
governing majority, which is the equivalent of the government at the national level. However,
coalitional discipline is not binding, such that parties of the governing majority are not required to
vote together on all policy issues. This implies that alternative coalitions can be formed on specic
policy areas and issues.
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Elections to the municipal councils are held every fourth year (before 1994 every third year).
The members of the governing councils are elected from multimember electoral districts. Around
two thirds of the municipalities only have one electoral district, but the large municipalities have
multiple districts. The election law dictates that a municipality with more than 24 000 eligible
voters, or a legislative council with more than 50 seats, must have at least two electoral districts.
When a municipality has more than one district, representatives are elected separately from each
district.
Within each district, the modied Sainte-Laguë method is used to distribute the seats.10 The
number of seats per district is legally bound between 15 and 49. Unlike the national level, no seats
are used to "even out" di¤erences between the share of votes and seats caused the allocation of
votes between the districts. There is no explicit electoral threshold for gaining representation in
the municipal council.11
3.2. Outcome Variables
I will look at three policy outcomes in the municipalities: immigration policy, environmental policy
and the tax rate. Descriptive statistics for the three outcome variables are provided in Table 1. In
the estimations, each policy outcome is measured as an average over the relevant election period.
Swedish Municipalities have large possibilities of inuencing the inow of immigrants. Once
refugee immigrants have been granted asylum in Sweden, they are placed in municipalities through
the placement program of the Swedish Immigration Agency. The process of this national program
has, in principle, remained the same from 1985 until today (Emilsson, 2008). The most important
change was that refugee immigrants were able to opt out of the placement program after 1994.
Each municipality must still be able to decide how many refugee immigrants should be received
through the program. Importantly, there have been large annual variations in the inow of refugee
immigrants to Sweden. For example, the intake spiked in 1994 and 2006 due to the wars in former
Yugoslavia and Iraq.
As the outcome variable for immigration policy, I will use the number of refugee immigrants
per capita placed in the municipality through the national placement program. The number placed
in each municipality is negotiated between the immigration agency and the municipalities. The
10 The decision to use the modied Sainte-Laguë method in Sweden, taken in 1952, was supposedly made to give
the Communist Party a disadvantage in the seat allocation to Swedish Parliament (Grofman & Lijphart, 2002).
11 Naturally, there is an implicit electoral threshold that is determined by the number of seats in each district. The
large variation in seats among the districts gives a large variation in the implicit threshold, ranging from around 1.5
to 5 %.
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inow through the placement program is relatively large, see Table 1, with an annual average of 1.9
immigrants per 1000 inhabitants, or 58.6 immigrants in absolute terms. Moreover, immigration is
often a highly contentious issue in municipal politics, sometimes even leading to the formation of
new local parties. The distribution of placed refugee immigrants per capita between municipalities
is skewed to the right. For this reason, I use a logarithmic transformation in the estimation.
When it comes to environmental policy, the municipalities have numerous responsibilities and
freedoms. Their responsibilities include wastewater treatment, waste collection, zoning, building
permits, giving permissions for, and controlling, smaller and medium sized industries. In each of
these areas, the municipalities also have large freedoms in deciding and carrying out their own
policies.12
As the outcome variable for environmental policy, I will use an environmental ranking of all
Swedish municipalities made by a Swedish environmental magazine (Miljö Eko, 1993-2001) in every
year between 1993 and 2001. This measure has previously been used by Dahlberg & Mörk (2002)
and Forslund et. al. (2008). The ranking is based on the initiatives undertaken by the municipality
and not the environmental outcomes. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider the environmental
ranking as an approximation, rather than as an absolute measure of the environmental policy
performance. The indicators used in the ranking include measures of sustainable procurement,
recycling programs, doing environmental audits, and "green" information to the inhabitants. The
contents and the maximum score of the survey changed somewhat over the years. For this reason,
I use the municipal score relative to the maximal score in the estimation.
The municipalities are free to set the tax rate as they see t, as long as the budget decit is not
too large.13 The tax rates vary considerably between municipalities, which can be seen in Table 1.
They also vary considerably over time, with a large increase between 1991 and 1992 caused by a
shift in responsibility for the care of the elderly from counties to municipalities. Tax rate expressed
as a percentage is used as the outcome variable.
3.3. Parties, Policy Position and Importance
Currently, there are seven parties in Swedish parliament and those parties also dominate municipal
politics, although many municipal councils also have representatives from local parties. The parties
are traditionally divided into two blocks with the Social Democrats and the Left Party in the left
12 I add one immigrant to all municipalities to be able to include all observations in the estimations. Excluding
observations with no immigrants does not change the results, nor does using alternative transformations.
13 In the election period between 1991 and 1993, the municipalities were not allowed to raise taxes. The results
are only marginally a¤ected by excluding this election period from the estimations.
13
block and the Conservative Party, the Center Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats
in the right block. At the municipal level, the formation of governing coalitions does not always
follow this division. For example, it is common that the parties from the middle of the left-right
political spectrum form governing coalitions. The Environmental Party can either be classied as
belonging to the left block, as in Svaleryd & Vlachos (2009) for example, or as independent, as in
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) for example. While the Environmental Party nowadays sides with the
left block in national politics, the picture is more subtle in municipal politics. Data on governing
coalitions from the elections in 1994, 1998 and 2002 suggest that it is appropriate to classify the
Environmental Party as block independent in municipal politics.
Apart from the seven national parties, the populist New Democracy had a successful election
in 1991, when it won 6.7 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections and 2.8 percent in the
municipal elections. Even though the party collapsed at the national level in 1994, it maintained
seats in 37 municipal councils before it more or less vanished from Swedish politics in the election
of 1998. New Democracy had four core issues: to reduce immigration, reduce taxation, make the
public sector more e¢ cient and "politics should be fun" (Rydgren, 2002).
Descriptive statistics for the parties are provided in Table 2, along with notation14 and how the
voter perceived policy position and importance. The size of each party is illustrated in Figures 2
and 3, where the seat share and the seat distribution for each party is shown in a histogram. Both
seat shares and seats for the three largest parties, the Social Democrats, the Conservative Party
and the Center Party, vary considerably across municipalities. Still, it is only the Social Democrats
that frequently hold a majority of the seats. The other parties rarely hold more than ten percent
of the seat share, or more than ve seats.
To form a prior on how parties might a¤ect policy, it is vital to know both what policy areas
are important for each party and the party positions in these areas. There are no studies that have
quantied the importance attached by Swedish parties to specic policy areas. While there is an
extensive literature on the positions of Swedish parties in the left-right policy space,15 there are
no studies that have quantitatively measured their positions on immigration and environmental
policies. Consequently, I construct my own measures of these features using survey data from
the Swedish National Election Studies Program (Statistics Sweden, 1982-2002).16 The results are
presented in Table 2 and Figure 5.
14 All election data have been collected from Statistics Sweden.
15 Gilljam & Oscarsson (1996), for example.
16 The studies are survey based and have been carried out by the Department of Political Science at Göteborg
University and Statistics Sweden in conjunction with each election since 1950. Each study has about 4000 respondents.
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To measure policy importance, I use a set of questions where the respondents list the ve most
important policy issues for each party. My index of importance of policy area y for party p is the
share of respondents that have listed an issue in policy area y as important for party p. These
questions are part of the survey in every election, which means that I can use data from every
election period17 covered by data on the outcome variables.
To measure policy positions, I take the commonly used approach of measuring how voters, on
average, place the parties on pre-constructed policy scales.18 I use a set of questions where the
respondents place each party on a policy scale, from 1 to 10, in various policy areas. For immigration
policy, parties were positioned according to their preferences for admitting more refugee immigrants,
with the score of 10 being most pro-immigration. For environmental policy, the parties were
positioned on a "green scale", with 10 as the score for being the most green. There is no explicit
question in the election survey where the parties are positioned on taxes. Instead, I use the parties
position on the left-right scale as a proxy for their position on taxes. Questions on environmental
policy and immigration policy were only included in the 1994 election, so I can only use that survey.
Figure 5 illustrates the measures for each respective policy area. In the gure, the perceived
policy positions are illustrated by the partiesposition on the horizontal axis, while the perceived
policy importance is illustrated by the size of the markers.
New Democracy is, by far, most anti-immigration and also the party for which immigration
is most important. On the other side of the policy spectrum, the Liberal Party is most pro-
immigration and gives the second highest importance to immigration policy. This is consistent with
Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup (2008) who argue that New Democracy and the Liberal Party are the
only two parties with wide-spread support that brought up immigration policy as a central policy
issue in Sweden during the period studied in this paper. New Democracy used limiting immigration
as one of its core election issues, while the Liberal Party was the only party to properly engage
in a debate against New Democracy about immigration. This was something manifested in public
by the former leader of the Swedish Liberal Party, Bengt Westerberg, who after the Center-Right
victory in the election of 1991, refused to appear on TV with the leaders of New Democracy. This
was met by New Democracys leader Bert Karlsson wishing Westerbergs daughter to be given
AIDS by an African immigrant.
Figure 5 also shows that the Environmental Party has the most "green" policy position and
17 New Democracy was only included in 1991 and 1994. The Environmental Party is included in the survey from
1988 and onward. The Christian Democrats were not included in 1982 and 1988.
18 Used in Macdonald et. al. (1991), Westholm (1997) and Kedar (2005), for example.
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gives environmental policy the highest importance. The Center Party also stands out from the other
parties both in "greenness" and high policy importance, even though this importance was greater
before the Environmental Party gained widespread support. There is no party on the opposite side
of the green scale that also placed importance on environmental policy.
The positions on the left-right policy scale, also illustrated in Figure 5, follow the division of
the blocks. The Left Party and the Conservative Party take opposite positions at the extremes of
the scale and are also the parties placing most importance on taxes. The positions are basically
the same as in Gilljam & Oscarsson (1996).
4. Baseline Specications
In this section, I rst estimate the e¤ect of the treatment variable, tp, on the seat share of each
party in the legislature. To see if the seat shares inuence policy, I then use the treatment variable
to estimate the e¤ect on policy outcomes.
4.1. Results for seat shares
I start with a graphical analysis of the average e¤ect of a party moving over a seat threshold on
a partys seat share at the electoral-district level.19 I then regress the treatment variable, tp, on
seat share at the municipal level. Data from all elections between 1982 and 2002 are used in the
analysis.
The graphical analysis follows the standard RD design procedure. I plot the binned averages
of party seat shares against the distance to a seat change, using a bin bandwidth of 0.1%. To
investigate whether the treatment e¤ect is a¤ected by the size of the party, I split the sample into
two groups below and above the sample median of 7.3 percentage points.
The results are displayed in Figure 4. The seat shares clearly jump at the thresholds. This jump
is less distinct for the larger parties, even though it is of the same magnitude in percentage points.
This is because there is a larger variation in the seat share for large parties and, most importantly,
a large party is often close to both winning and losing a seat. The size of the jump is almost three
percentage points. This is because the average district magnitude is 30, so winning one extra seat
means, on average, an increased seat share of 1/30.
Turning to the regression analysis, I regress the seat share of each party on treatment variable,
19 It is not possible to make a graphical analysis at the municipality level when municipalities have multiple electoral
districts.
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tp; controlling for being close to a threshold by cp. I use three denitions of close elections, with
cut-o¤ distances to a threshold of 0:5%; 0:25% and 0:1%. The model is estimated both with and
without a fourth-order polynomial of the vote share, v0p.20
The results in Table 3 show a clear e¤ect of the treatment variable, tp, on the seat share for all
parties. The e¤ect is always positive and often close to 1. Including the fourth-order polynomial
vote share control function greatly enhances the precision of the estimates, even though it does
not signicantly change their size. After controlling for vote shares, the e¤ect is always highly
signicant and close to 1, but decreases when observations further from the threshold are included
( increased). The latter can also be seen in Figure 4, as the average di¤erence in seat shares above
and below the threshold decreases with the distance to the threshold.
Table 3 shows the number of identifying observations for each party (observations where tp 6= 0).
There are more identifying observations for the larger parties, since they have a higher probability
of being close to a threshold. The share of identifying observations is relatively large. In total,
there are about 2000 observations for the elections between 1982 and 2002. Out of these between
500 and 1000, depending on the size of the party, are identifying observations for  = 0:25%.
4.2. Results for policy
I now estimate the e¤ects of party representation on policy. When discussing the results, I focus
on parties with the largest expected inuence on each policy area, which are those perceived as
having the most extreme policy positions and as giving high importance to the policy areas.
In the baseline specication, corresponding to equation 5, I estimate the e¤ect of party repre-
sentation on policy outcomes in reduced form, using the treatment variable, tp. To dene closeness,
I use the cut-o¤ distance to a threshold of 0.25 percentage points of the vote share,  = 0:25%. The
control function of the vote share, g (V0Pi), is dened as a fourth-order polynomial. I also include
election-period and municipality xed e¤ects. The Social Democrats, S, is used as the reference
(omitted) party in this and all other specications. That is, all estimated e¤ects on policy refer to
a seat share gain of party p at the expense of the Social Democrats: p   S .
To evaluate if there are any signicant party e¤ects, it is instructive to look at comparisons
between all pairs of parties. For example, regarding immigration policy, it is natural to compare
what happens if New Democracy, ND, gains a seat from the Liberal party, FP , (ND   FP =
(ND   S)  (FP   S)), because these are the parties with the most extreme policy positions.
20 Using another polynomial to dene g (v0Pi) a¤ects neither the size nor the precision of the estimates.
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The estimation results are presented in Table 4. In Figures 6-8, I plot the point estimates for
each policy against the partiespolicy positions, as perceived by the voters. The size of the markers
in these gures is weighted by perceived importance of the policy area for each party. Finally,
Table 5 shows the cross-party comparisons (p   p00) together with p-values for the hypothesis
(p 6= p00) for the two parties that are perceived as giving most importance to the respective
policy areas. Table 4 also includes the results from OLS21 and 2SLS regressions. In the latter, the
treatment variable tp is used to instrument the e¤ect of seat shares on policy outcome.22
Immigration Policy The results for immigration policy are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and
Figure 6. What stands out in Column 1 of Table 4 is the large negative point estimate of New
Democracy. The Liberal Party has the largest positive point estimate. Recall that these are the
only national parties that have proled themselves on immigration policy and are perceived by
voters as having the most extreme policy positions. Figure 6 plots the estimated policy e¤ects
against the perceived policy positions and shows a striking correspondence between the perceived
policy positions and the estimated e¤ects of New Democracy and the Liberal Party. The gure
also shows that the estimated e¤ects of the other parties are in line with voter perceptions.
Table 5 shows that the e¤ect of New Democracy is signicantly negative as compared to all seven
national parties. This can be seen in Column 1, which shows the e¤ect of New Democracy relative
to each individual party, specied in the rst column. Furthermore, the e¤ect of an increased seat
share for the pro-immigration Liberal Party is positive and signicant as compared to all parties
except the Environmental Party and the Social Democrats. This can be seen in Column 2. Note
that the coe¢ cients in the row for the Social Democrats are the same as the regression coe¢ cients
in Table 4, in which the Social Democrats are used as the reference party. That none of the
other parties signicantly a¤ects immigration is quite expected, given that they have not proled
themselves in this dimension of policy.
The estimated e¤ects are fairly large. The estimated di¤erence between New Democracy and
the other parties is between 11 and 22. A di¤erence of 10 between a pair of parties suggests that
the placement of refugee immigrants would change by ten percent due to a seat share shift of one
percentage point between the parties. This corresponds to a change of six placed refugee immigrants
per year in the average municipality.
21 The OLS specication is dened by equation 2.1 and includes election period and municipality xed e¤ects.
22 More specically, I use equation 2.5 in the rst stage to instrument the seat share of each party with the
treatment variable, tp. In the second stage, I once more use equation 2.5, but replace the treatment variables with
the tted values of the seat shares from the rst stage.
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To exemplify these e¤ects, I compare the placement of refugee immigrants after the election
in Oxelösund, in the county of Stockholm, in 1991 to the placement after the election in nearby
Nynäshamn in 1994. In these elections, New Democracy and the Liberal Party were close to (using
 = 0:25%), and on opposite sides of, seat thresholds. In Oxelösund, New Democracy received 7.82
percent of the votes and two seats (out of a legislature total of 31), while the Liberal Party received
7.92 percent of the votes and three seats. Obviously, with a vote share shift of 0.1 percentage points,
the seat allocation between the parties would have shifted. In Nynäshamn, New Democracy received
1.70 percent of the votes and one seat (out of a legislature total of 45), while the Liberal Party
received 5.52 percent of the votes and two seats. With a vote share shift of only 0.14 percentage
points, New Democracy could have been left without a seat and the Liberal Party would then have
gained a third seat. It turned out that Oxelösund placed an average of 69 refugee immigrants,
while Nynäshamn placed an average of 40. The estimated e¤ects suggest that about three quarters
of this di¤erence can be explained by the di¤erences in marginal seat share allocations for New
Democracy and the Liberal Party which are as good as random.
Simple OLS estimates of the e¤ect of seat shares on policy produce misleading results, as can
be seen in Column 2 of Table 4. OLS estimates suggest a negative and signicant e¤ect when the
Liberal Party wins seats from several other parties. Given that the estimated e¤ect of the treatment
variable on the seat share is close to one, the 2SLS estimation should provide results that are only
marginally di¤erent from the baseline specication. This is indeed what I nd in Column 3 of Table
4.
Environmental Policy I now move on to discuss the results for environmental policy, presented
in Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 7. The Environmental Party, the only party with a clear green prole,
has the largest positive point estimate in Column 4 of Table 4. The other party with a relatively
green image, the Center Party, has a point estimate that corresponds to the median e¤ect of all
parties. New Democracy, which is perceived as being the least "green", has the largest negative
point estimate, albeit with a large standard error. As in the case of immigration policy, Figure 7
shows a striking correspondence between the estimated e¤ects and the perceived policy positions.
The exception is the large positive point estimate for the Conservative Party, which is not consistent
with the voters perceiving the Conservative Party as one of the least "green" parties.
Column 3 of Table 5 shows that an increased seat share for the Environmental Party has a
positive and signicant e¤ect on environmental policy when the seats are taken from all parties
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except the Conservative Party. The voters perceive the Center Party as second to the Environmental
Party in both "greenness" and the importance given to environmental policy. This party does not
have a positive signicant e¤ect vis à vis any party, as shown in Column 4. Not shown in the table
is the fact that the Conservative Party has a signicantly positive e¤ect as compared to several
parties. The negative e¤ect of New Democracy is, however, only signicant as compared to the
Environmental and the Conservative Party.
As in the case of immigration policy, the estimated e¤ects are large. The estimated di¤erence
between the Environmental Party and most other parties is around two. This implies that the
relative environmental ranking would change by two percentage points from a seat share shift of
one percentage point between the parties. That the policy e¤ect is relatively large is not surprising.
Some of the policies required to increase the environmental ranking are easily implemented. A shift
in the relative ranking by ten percentage points could, for example, be achieved by implementing
a information campaign to the citizens and companies of the municipality.
To exemplify the estimated e¤ects, I will compare the environmental rankings after the 1994
elections in the municipalities of Forshaga and Årjäng in the rural county of Värmland in Eastern
Sweden. In Forshaga, the Environmental Party received 3.69 percent of the votes and two seats
(out of a legislature total of 41), while in Årjäng it received 3.55 percent of the votes and one
seat (out of a legislature total of 41). In both elections, it would have been su¢ cient with a vote
share shift of less than 0.1 percentage points to change the seat allocation for the Environmental
Party. The seat share di¤erence between the two municipalities for the Environmental Party of 2.5
percentage points suggests that the environmental ranking would be ve percent higher in Årjäng,
and ve percent lower in Forshaga if the Environmental Party had ended up on the other side of
the seat threshold. The relative environmental ranking during the election period was 46 percent
for Forshaga and 35 percent for Årjäng. Half of this di¤erence (ve percentage points) can thus be
explained by the di¤erence in seat share for the Environmental Party which is as good as random.
The estimated di¤erence also corresponds to the fact that in each year during the election period,
Forshaga performed better at providing environmental information to its citizens.
The OLS estimates in Column 6 of Table 4 fail to identify any e¤ect of the Environmental
Party, or any other party. This provides further evidence of the OLS providing misleading results.
As for immigration policy, the 2SLS specication (Column 5 in Table 4) provides results that are
only marginally di¤erent from the baseline specication.
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Tax Rate The results for the tax rate are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 8. Column 7 of
Table 4 shows that the Conservative Party has the largest negative point estimate. This is indeed
the party that voters perceive as the right-most party on the left-right policy spectrum, and as the
party that gives the highest importance to tax policy. Even though the Left Party is furthest to
the left, it is not the party with the largest positive point estimate on tax policy. Figure 8 shows a
clear correspondence between the estimated e¤ects of the parties. The correspondence is not nearly
as striking as for the two previous policies, however.
When looking at cross-party comparisons, the standard errors are su¢ ciently large to eliminate
all signicant di¤erences between any pair of parties. This is shown for the Left Party and the
Conservative Party in Table 5. Even though the e¤ects are in line with voter perceptions, they are
not su¢ ciently large to compensate for the large standard errors.
The point estimates are actually quite large. The di¤erence in e¤ects between the Left Party
and the Conservative Party is three. This implies that a ten percentage point shift in seat shares
between the two parties would change the tax rate by 0.3 percentage points. This magnitude is in
line with the e¤ects found by Petterson-Lidbom (2008) from the traditional left-wing parties holding
a majority of the seats. Hence, I cannot really draw any rm conclusion that party representation
does not have any e¤ect on the tax rate.
There are no substantial di¤erences between the baseline, 2SLS and OLS specications (see
Columns 8 and 9 in Table 4).
5. Alternative Specications and Robustness Checks
In this section, I evaluate the validity of the identifying assumption by testing alternatives to the
baseline specication and conducting several robustness checks.
5.1. Alternative Specications
Are the estimated e¤ects of party representation on policy sensitive to using alternative specica-
tions? To corner this question, I will test specications with di¤erent cut-o¤ values to dene close
elections, , and specications with alternative sets of covariates. I start by dening the alternative
specications. Then, I discuss the general ndings for each alternative specication. Finally, I
discuss results that are specic to each policy outcome.
In Tables 6, 7 and 8, I investigate eight alternative specications for each policy outcome. I test
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two alternative cut-o¤ values to dene close elections,  = 0:5%, in Columns 1-2 of each table, and
 = 0:1%, in Columns 8-9 of each table. For each of the two cut-o¤ values, I use specications both
with and without municipality xed e¤ects. Using the cut-o¤ value from the baseline specication,
 = 0:25%, I examine four alternative specications. In the rst specication (Column 3), I do not
include any control variables. I then add the vote share control function (Column 4) and election
period xed e¤ects (see Column 5). As a point of reference, I show the results of the baseline
specication, which includes municipality xed e¤ects (Column 6). Finally, I add a vector of control
variables23, including education level, demographic composition and population size (Column 7).
As for the cut-o¤ points for dening close elections, , the standard errors decrease when 
increases. This is intuitive, since the number of identifying observations increases as  increases.
Changing the interval also changes the point estimates, even though no changes are statistically
signicant. The coe¢ cients change has two explanations. A higher value of  expands the sample
of identifying observations and eventually makes the treatment endogenous. Using  = 0:5%,
the di¤erence in the vote share for a small party on opposite sides of the "close interval" is not
arbitrary, implying that the interval might be too wide. The results are also more sensitive to
including municipality xed e¤ects for  = 0:5% than for the two smaller intervals. The results
suggest that  = 0:5% is too wide a denition of close elections, while the large standard errors
make  = 0:1% too narrow a denition.
If the identifying assumption holds, the covariates should only a¤ect the standard errors and
not the point estimates. This is indeed the case. The most important reduction in standard errors
is achieved by including election-period xed e¤ects; see the di¤erence between Columns 4 and
5. There is also a fairly large reduction in standard errors from including the vote share control
function g (V0Pi), compare Columns 3 and 4, and municipality xed e¤ects, compare Columns 1 and
2, Columns 5 and 6, and Columns 8 and 9. Including the vector of control variables has minimal
e¤ects on both the point estimates and the standard errors, as seen in Columns 6 and 7.
I now discuss the specic results for each policy area, starting with immigration policy. The
main results, shown in Table 6, are not sensitive to the alternative specications. The reduction in
standard errors, obtained by including the covariates, is important for getting statistically signicant
results, however.
The alternative specications for environmental policy in Table 7 show that the positive esti-
mated e¤ect of the Environmental Party, MP , is not very sensitive. When using  = 0:5%, the
23 Data for the control variables are collected from Statistics Sweden.
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point estimate decreases, but the e¤ect is still signicant as compared to several other parties. For
the Conservative Party, M , the positive estimated e¤ect is more sensitive both to changing the
denition of close elections and using di¤erent sets of covariates.
The results of the alternative specications for the tax rate are shown in Table 8. Here, the
reduction in standard errors when including covariates is much larger than for the two other policies.
The large reduction when including municipality xed e¤ects is likely to be caused by long-term
di¤erences in economic conditions between municipalities. Even though the point estimates are
sensitive to using alternative specications, none of the alternative specications indicate that
representation of individual parties a¤ects the tax rate.
5.2. Robustness Checks
To check the validity of the identifying assumption, I take two approaches. I graphically examine
if there is a shift in the vote share when moving over a seat threshold. I also regress the treatment
variable, tp, on municipal background characteristics that should not be a¤ected by political factors
in the short run.
First, I graph the balancing of vote shares close to seat thresholds. Since the distance to a seat
threshold is not only dependent on the vote share of the individual party, this analysis is important
to validate that the distance measure is correctly dened. A shift in the vote share when moving
over a threshold would indicate an invalid distance measure and a biased treatment variable.
In the graphs, I plot the vote share, instead of the seat share, against the distance to a seat
threshold. As before, I use binned averages with a width of 0.1%. To investigate whether the
identifying assumption holds irrespective of party size, I split the sample into two groups, below
and above the sample median of 7.3 percentage points. Figure 9 clearly shows that there is no
"jump" in the vote share at the seat threshold, irrespective of party size. This suggests that the
identifying assumption holds.
In the regression analysis, I test if the treatment variable, tp; has an e¤ect on background
variables that should not be a¤ected by short-term political outcomes. A signicant outcome
would indicate an invalid identifying assumption. The background variables I examine are real
income per capita, population share with higher education, population share of children and the
municipal population in logarithmic form. The vector of control variables is not included since
some of the control variables are now used as outcome variables. I estimate the model both with
and without municipality xed e¤ects.
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The results are presented in Table 9. Some of the parties are found to have signicant e¤ects
on the background variables in comparison to other parties; see, for example, the Environmental
Party, MP , in Column 1, the Center Party, C, in Columns 2 and 8, and the Conservative Party,
M , in Column 8. Unlike the estimates for the e¤ects on policy outcomes, however, these estimates
are very sensitive and disappear when municipality xed e¤ects are included or excluded. This
suggests that the signicant e¤ects are random ndings. Thus, the results do not provide any
evidence against the identifying assumption.
6. Mechanisms of representation
The results in the baseline specication clearly show that party representation a¤ects policy out-
comes. But the results provide little guidance regarding the mechanisms behind the representation
e¤ects. In this section, I will carefully test one of the potential mechanisms, which is legislative
representation. Then, I discuss other potential mechanisms.
6.1. Legislative Representation
The methodology of this paper allows me to examine if legislative presence is an important mech-
anism behind the estimated representation e¤ects. Such a mechanism could reect the presence of
a party a¤ecting the salience of a given policy area in the legislature. For example, having a green
party in the legislature might raise the awareness of environmental issues amongst all parties. If
legislative presence is an important mechanism, we would expect representation e¤ects to be larger
for the rst seat won by the party.
To estimate if the representation e¤ect is larger for the rst seat, I add a second treatment
variable to the baseline specication, dened by equation 2.5. I dene the second treatment variable
as an interaction term between the representation treatment variable, 1Si
Pe=N
e=1 tpe, and a dummy
for being close to the threshold for the rst seat, crp. In practice, this means that I estimate the
representation e¤ect conditional on being close to the threshold for the rst seat. As previously,
being close to a threshold is dened by the cut-o¤ value . In the estimations, I use the same
denition of close elections,  = 0:25%, as in the baseline specication. Since it is not random if
the party is close to the threshold for the rst seat, I also include, crp, as a control variable. The
results are presented in Table 10. The estimates for the linear representation e¤ects are presented in
the rows labeled Seat Share, while the representation e¤ect for gaining the rst seat are presented in
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the rows labeled First Seat. I also show the share of the identifying observations for each treatment
variable.
In general, the results suggest that none of the key ndings from the baseline specication can
be explained by legislative presence. For some parties and policies, the representation e¤ects are
actually larger when the party is not close to the threshold for the rst seat. This suggests that there
could be some type of increasing returns to scale for small parties inuence on policy. Explanations
for this include that representatives can argue more forcefully when having the support of fellow
party members, or that very small parties are very likely to be dummy players in forming coalitional
majorities.24
The results for immigration, shown in Column 1 of Table 10, suggest that the representation
e¤ects are not larger at the threshold for the rst seat. The representation e¤ect of the Liberal
Party is basically the same at the threshold as away from it. For New Democracy, the point
estimates suggest that the e¤ect is actually larger away from the threshold for the rst seat. This
might suggest that New Democracy had better possibilities of inuencing policy in municipalities
where they had more voter support. One interesting nding is that the Left Party seems to have
a large negative e¤ect away from the threshold for the rst seat. The huge negative e¤ect of the
Conservative Party at the threshold for the rst seat is a product of the fact that there are only a
couple of observations close to this threshold.
The results for environmental policy, see Column 2 of Table 10, show that the estimated repre-
sentation e¤ect of the Environmental Party is larger away from threshold for the rst seat. As in
the case with New Democracys e¤ect on immigration, it could be the case that the Environmental
Party has better possibilities of inuencing policy when it has stronger support. As for immigra-
tion, the e¤ect of the Left Party seems to be larger when not close to the threshold for the rst
seat. The large and signicant e¤ect of the Center Party around the threshold for the rst seat is
likely to be a product of few identifying observations.
The results for the tax rate, shown in Column 3 of Table 10, do still not show a statistically
signicant e¤ect of party representation on the tax rate. The large e¤ect of the Center Party at
the threshold for the rst seat is, as above, likely to be a product of few identifying observations.
24 A dummy player is a party that is not pivotal for any possible coalition of parties gaining a seat majority.
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6.2. Other Potential Mechanisms
As mentioned in the introduction, there are at least two other potential mechanisms whereby
representation can a¤ect policy. First, party representation a¤ects what, and how, coalitions are
formed; as in e.g., Austen-Smith & Banks (1988). In this sense, an increased seat share might
increase the probability of a party being in a governing coalition. Second, party representation
a¤ects the voting power of a party; as in e.g. Banzhaf (1964) and Holler (1982). The idea of the
voting-power indexes is to measure how pivotal a party is for forming legislative majorities relative
to other parties. The more pivotal a party, the larger its inuence be on policy should be. Let me
briey discuss each of these two potential mechanisms.
Estimating representation e¤ects within a framework of governing coalitions requires a method
for simultaneously estimating the e¤ect of shifts in seat shares of individual parties and seat ma-
jorities for coalitions of parties. This, in turn, requires a new method for dening close elections.
Developing this is part of my ongoing work.25 Preliminary results suggest that only parts of the
representation e¤ects can be explained by changes in coalition majorities.26 The main represen-
tation e¤ects on immigration and environmental policy cannot be explained by the possibility of
forming left- or right-wing coalitions. Holding the balance of power between the traditional left-
and right-wing blocks does not explain the e¤ect of New Democracy on immigration policy and
only a third of the Environmental Partys e¤ect on environmental policy.
Estimating representation e¤ects within a voting power framework also requires methodological
developments. This is also part of my ongoing work.27 If changes in voting power, as dened
by for example the Banzhaf index, were the main mechanism behind the representation e¤ects,
changes in voting power would be a better predictor of policy outcomes than changes in seat
shares. Preliminary results suggest this not to be the case.
7. Discussion
I have developed a method for measuring how changes in the legislative representation of small
parties a¤ect policy outcomes in multi-party proportional election systems. Applying the method
to Swedish municipalities, I show that changes in the representation of anti-immigration and green
25 Contact the author for a more detailed description.
26 Such as the left or right block holding a majority of seats, or either the Environmental Party or New Democracy
holding the balance of power between the two blocks.
27 There are several complicating factors for doing this. The most important being that there are there are multiple
thresholds for voting power changes, which also are of di¤erent sizes.
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parties have a causal e¤ect on the key policies for these parties. However, party representation does
not seem to a¤ect the tax rate.
My causality interpretation of the results is supported by various robustness checks. A graphical
analysis of moving across a seat threshold clearly shows that there is only a shift in the seat share
and not in the vote share. Similarly, the regressions testing the e¤ect of the treatment variables on
background variables provide support for the identifying assumption. My results show that using a
simple OLS to estimate the e¤ect of party representation gives misleading results; the OLS results
suggest that party representation has no, or little, e¤ect on policy outcomes.
The estimated e¤ects basically agree with voter perceptions of the parties. Those parties that
are found to a¤ect immigration and environmental policy the most are also those parties that
voters identify with the most extreme policy positions and with giving most importance to each
policy area. The positive e¤ect of the Liberal Party and the negative e¤ect of New Democracy on
immigration are thus exactly what we would expect. The estimated e¤ects are fairly large and not
sensitive to using alternative specications.
That New Democracy had a negative e¤ect on immigration suggests that the large growth
of anti-immigration parties in Western Europe could have a¤ected immigration policy. However,
New Democracy was a relatively moderate anti-immigration party (Rydgren, 2002) and the e¤ects
that I nd might be conditional on this. More extreme parties might have had smaller (or larger)
possibilities of a¤ecting policy. As an additional qualication, the political institutions of Swedish
municipalities might provide favorable conditions for anti-immigration parties a¤ecting policy. It
may thus be premature to extrapolate the results to other countries and contexts.
The positive e¤ect of the Environmental Party on environmental policy is consistent with the
voter perceptions of the party as the most "green" party with a large weight on environmental
policy. That a small single-issue party, like the Environmental Party, is able to inuence policy
provides support for reduced-form studies which nd that proportional election systems lead to
stricter environmental policies than majoritarian systems, such as Fredriksson & Millimet (2004a)
on environmental policies and Fredriksson & Millimet (2004b) on environmental taxes. One argu-
ment behind such results is that a proportional election system allows environmental interests to
be represented in legislatures. In this study, I show that representation can indeed have an e¤ect
on environmental policy.
Even though the estimated party e¤ects on the tax rate conform with the way how voters place
the parties on a left-right policy scale, there are no statistically signicant results. This indicates
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that marginal shifts in party representation are not su¢ cient to substantially a¤ect the tax rate.
Pettersson-Lidboms (2008) nding of a positive e¤ect on the tax rate from the parties of the left
block holding a legislative majority suggests that legislative majorities may be the relevant political
dimension when estimating the e¤ect of legislative outcomes on general-interest policies.
In terms of underlying channels, my results in Section 6 suggest that the representation e¤ects
are not larger for the rst seat than for subsequent seats. This suggests that the representation
e¤ects cannot be explained by legislative presence as such. An extension where the e¤ects of coali-
tion majorities are estimated simultaneously with the representation e¤ects would be an important
development of this paper. To do this well, some methodological problems would have to be solved.
But the preliminary results indicate that the e¤ects on immigration and environmental policy are
not driven by the possibility of forming left- or right-wing coalitions. Neither are the results driven
by New Democracy or the Environmental Party holding the balance of power between the two
traditional blocks. In ongoing work, I am developing a method for estimating the e¤ect of vot-
ing power in a Banzhaf/Shapley-Shubik framework, which also has a potential for clarifying the
mechanism through which party representation a¤ects policy.
Interesting dimensions of heterogenous representation e¤ects that could be examined in further
work include municipality characteristics, election periods and governing coalitions. In general,
there are too few observations to get precise estimates of heterogeneous e¤ects. Nonetheless, pre-
liminary results indicate that some e¤ects could be heterogeneous over both municipality character-
istics and party size. A general problem with estimating heterogeneous e¤ects is that the variables
used to dene the heterogeneity are likely to be endogenous. For example, the population of the
municipality is correlated with both the education and the income level. If we observe heterogenous
e¤ects with respect to the size of municipalities, we would not know if it is population, education
or income that drives the results.
Strictly speaking, this study only tells us how party representation a¤ects policy in Swedish
municipalities. To draw some general conclusions about policy e¤ects of party representation in
proportional election systems, it is important to apply the method to other countries. Given that
the method is suitable for all types of seat-allocation methods, this is another natural extension of
my study.
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8. Appendix
8.1. Seat allocation methods
The basic idea behind proportional elections is to make the seat shares of the parties proportional
to the vote shares. For this purpose, several types of methods can be used. The most common
types are highest average methods, which are most common, and largest remainder methods.
The principle behind the highest averages methods is to distribute the seats one by one in
consecutive rounds using a series of divisors. The divisors are calculated using the number of seats
allocated to the party in previous rounds. In each round, the seat is awarded to the party with the
highest resulting quotient. The procedure is repeated until all seats have been allocated. What
sets the highest averages methods apart is the divisor series used. The two most common divisor
series are the dHondt divisor series, "1; 2; 3; 4; :::" and the Sainte-Laguë divisor series, "1; 3; 5; 7; :::".
In practice, the only di¤erence between the dHondt and Sainte-Laguë divisor series is that the
average threshold for getting the rst seat is twice as large for dHondt. A common modication of
the Sainte-Laguë divisor series, conveniently named the modied Sainte-Laguë divisor series, uses
1.4 as the rst divisor. This has the e¤ect of increasing the relative threshold for getting the rst
seat.
The principle behind largest remainder methods is to rst divide the votes of the party with
a quota representing the number of votes required for a seat. Each party is the given the number
of seats corresponding to the integer of the quota. After that, one is usually left with unallocated
seats. These seats are allocated on basis of the fraction of the quota that remains after subtracting
the integer; hence the name of the method. What sets larger remainder methods apart is how the
quota is calculated. The two most common quotas are the Hare quota (VS ) and the Drop quota
(1+ V1+S ). The basic di¤erence between using the di¤erent quotas is that the threshold for getting
the rst seat is higher when using the drop quota.
In general, the di¤erences between using highest averages methods or largest remainder methods
are not larger than the di¤erences within in each class of methods (Lijphart, 1990). Using the Hare
quota gives similar results as using the Sainte-Laguë divisor series, while using the Drop quota
is similar to using the dHondt divisor series. For the method developed in this paper, there are
important di¤erences between highest averages methods and largest remainder methods, however.
What method within each class that is used is of no importance.
The key di¤erence between highest averages methods and largest remainder methods that is
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relevant for this paper is in how to consider the distance to a seat threshold. The divisor series used
for a party in largest averages methods is a¤ected by the size of a party, while it is independent
of the votes for the other parties. The opposite is true for the largest remainder methods. Since
the same quota is used for all parties, it is independent of the size of the party, but dependent
on the votes for the other parties. The consequence of this di¤erence is that the distance to a
seat threshold for a party is easier to dene for the largest remainder method. This is because
the minimal distance to a seat change can always be dened in how many votes the party would
need to lose or gain to experience a seat change. For largest averages methods, the distance to a
seat change is instead dened as the smallest total change in vote shares that would be needed for
a party to experience a vote change. This will be explained in detail in the following part of the
appendix.
8.2. Measuring the distance to seat threshold
The method is formalized for largest averages methods and, specically, for the modied Sainte-
Laguë divisor series. There are two reasons for using this divisor series. First, it is the divisor
used in Swedish Municipalities. Second, it is the divisor series for which it is most complicated to
calculate the distance to seat changes. This means that no complexity will be added when applying
the method to other divisor series. To adjust the method to other divisor series, one simply has
to change how the comparison numbers are calculated. How to measure the distances to the seat
thresholds for largest remainder methods is discussed at the end of the appendix.
Before showing how the distance to a seat change is calculated, I need to introduce additional
notation. The comparison number the party will have when all seats are distributed is dened
as cp(esp) = vp1+2esp if esp > 0; cp(esp) = vp1:4 if esp = 0. The comparison number for the last seat
given to a party is dened as cp(esp   1) = vp1+2(esp 1) if esp > 1; cp(esp   1) = vp1:4 if sp = 1. The
comparison number for the last seat given to a party is dened as max(c1(es1); c2(es2); :::; cp(esp).
Similarly, the comparison number for the last seat distributed to a party, cmin(es  1), is dened as
min(c1(es1   1); (c2(es2   1); :::; cP (esp   1)):
To dene and measure the distance to a seat threshold, I must rst formally dene seat thresh-
olds and the conditions for parties gaining or losing a seat.
I dene the threshold for gaining a seat as the comparison number for the seat distributed in
the nal round in the seat distribution. If a party is to gain a seat, its comparison for the number
of seats it holds, (cp(esp), must be larger than (cmin(es  1). The condition for Party p gaining a seat
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is thus:
cp(esp) > cmin(es  1): (8.1)
I dene the threshold for losing a seat through the comparison number of the party next in line to
receive a seat, cmax(es). For a party to lose a seat, it must be that the comparison number for the
last seat it got, cp(esp   1); becomes smaller than cmax(es). The condition for Party p losing a seat
is thus:
cp(esp   1) < cmax(es): (8.2)
Per denition, is must always be the case that when one condition is met for a party the other
condition must be met for another party. The intuition behind this is that a party cannot gain/lose
a seat without another party losing/gaining a seat.
The conditions for having a seat change are used to calculate the distance to a seat change. It
is important to note that the conditions for Party p cannot only be met through changes in votes
for party p, but also through changes in votes for the other parties. This is clearly seen in the
three-party setting illustrated in Figure 1.
What change in votes that is required for a specic change in comparison number is dependent
on the number of seats held by a party since the divisor of each party is based on the number
of seats it holds. To show this, I rst take the derivative of the comparison number, cp(esp), with
respect to votes
@cp(esp)
@vp(mi)
=
1
(1 + esp) : (8.3)
Then, I take the cross derivative with respect to the number of seats
@cp(esp)
@vp@esp =   1(1 + esp)2 : (8.4)
This has important implications for how the distance to a seat change is dened, since the vote
changes required for parties to fulll the condition for a seat change are dependent on the number
of seats the party holds.
I will now illustrate how to measure the distance to a seat change in practice. This is done by
separately calculating the vote changes required for a seat change under di¤erent scenarios. The
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smallest vote change required under each of these scenarios will dene the distance to a threshold
for a party.
To illustrate the di¤erent scenarios, I will show the di¤erent scenarios under which Party 1
will gain a seat in a three-party setting, illustrated in Figure 10. Five di¤erent scenarios will be
illustrated, denoted by a, b, c, d and e. For each scenario, I will also show how to calculate the
distance to a seat change. In the di¤erent settings, Party 1 will either be next in line to receive a
seat, c1(es1) = cmax(es), see a and b, or second in line after Party 3 c1(es1) < c3(es3), see c, d and e.
Party 2 is always next in line to lose a seat.
The scenario is that Party 1 gains enough votes such that c1(es1) > c2(es2 1). This is illustrated
in a) and c). This vote change is calculated as follows:
c2(es2   1)  c1(es1)
1:4
if es1 = 0
c2(es2   1)  c1(es1)
1 + es1  2 if es1 > 0:
The second vote change is that either Party 2 or 3 loses enough votes such that c1(es1) > c2(es2 1)
or c1(es1) > c3(es3   1). This vote change is illustrated in b. Even though Party 3 has a higher
comparison number than Party 2, it could be that a smaller vote change is required for Party 3 if
it holds less seats than Party 3. This vote change for Party 2 is calculated as follows (and similarly
for Party 3):
c2(es2   1)  c1(es1)
1:4
if es2 = 1
c2(es2   1)  c1(es1)
1 + (es2   1)  2 if es2 > 1:
The last two scenarios of vote changes are combinations of two parties having changes in their
vote change, shown in d and e. In both these cases, Party 1 gains a seat from party 2. Here two
things must happen. First Party 1 must be the next party in line to receive a seat, which will be
the case if c1(es1) > c3(es3). This can either be achieved by Party 1 gaining votes, see d, or by Party
3 losing votes, see e. Second, Party 2 must lose enough votes, such that c1(es1) > c2(es2   1). Note
that Party 2 must lose more votes in scenario e. The distance for the combination shown in d is
calculated as follows. For simplicity, I only show the calculation for es1 > 0 & es2 > 1:
c3(es3)  c1(es1)
1 + es1  2 + c2(es2   1)  c3(es3)1 + (es2   1)  2 if es1 > 0 & es2 > 1:
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The distance for the combination shown in d is calculated as follows. For simplicity, I only show
the calculation for es3 > 0 & es2 > 1:
c3(es3)  c1(es1)
1 + es3  2 + c2(es2   1)  c1(es1)1 + (es2   1)  2 if es3 > 0 & es2 > 1:
Any of the votes changes described above could be the minimum vote change required for
party 1 to gain a seat. Which one it is depends on how many seats are held by each party. The
distance for Party 1 losing a seat is calculated in the same manner as described above. Extending
the calculations to scenarios with more than three parties is straightforward. In principle, the
calculations only have to be extended to take into account that the vote changes can occur in more
dimensions.
8.3. Largest remainder methods
For largest remainder methods, it is simpler to calculate the distance to a seat threshold. This is
due to the fact that the same quota is used for all parties. To see this formally, we can take the
derivative of both the Hare, VeS , and the Drop quota, 1 + V1+eS , with respect to the number of seats
held by party p
 VeS
esp = 0 (8.5)


1 + V
1+eS

esp = 0: (8.6)
The vote change required for a seat change is independent of the size of a party. To calculate the
distance to a seat change for Party p, one will thus only have to look at the vote change required
for Party p.
8.4. Illustration of method
To illustrate how seats are distributed and how I dene close elections in practice, consider the
municipal election in Sigtuna, a municipality outside of Stockholm, in 1991. In Table 11, the key
statistics for the election and the seat distribution are presented. The election included all seven
national parties, New Democracy, ND, and a local party, Loc. The Social Democrats, S, is the
largest party, followed by the Conservative Party,M . Note that the Conservative Party would have
to gain around one percent of the votes to win an additional seat. It would only require a combined
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vote change of around 0.1 percent of the votes for the local party and the Environmental Party,
MP; for the Conservative Party to gain a seat from the local party. This illustrates the importance
of looking at vote changes in all dimensions to dene the minimum distance to a seat change.
In this election, if  = :25%, cM = cMP = cS = cV = cLoc = 1; tS = tLoc = 12 ; tM = tMP = tV =
 12 ; since theM ,MP and V parties were close to winning another seat while the S and Loc parties
were close to losing a seat. Both cp and tp are zero for all the other parties, p = C;FP;KD;ND,
since neither of these parties were close to winning or losing a seat. Identication is based on
the assumption variations in vote support within the narrow interval of  = :25% being random.
However, it is not random in what places parties are in close competition for seats. The average
policy in these places is picked up by the dummy variables. However, conditional on being in these
places, the outcome of the close seat competition is random and hence, I can investigate the e¤ects
of policy from these random seat allocations.
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Figure 1. Distribution of three seats between three parties as a function of their respective vote 
shares. The number of seats of each party is written within each contiguous “seat outcome” region in 
the order Party 1, Party 2 and Party 3. Regions defined as close to a threshold for Party 1 are marked 
in grey. The vertical lines indicate that Party 1 is close to gaining a seat, while the horizontal line 
indicates its being close to losing a seat. The seats are allocated using the Sainte-Laguë method. 
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Figure 2.  Histograms of the seat shares for all parties in the elections between 1982 and 2002 
(only 1991 and 1994 for New Democracy). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Histograms of the seats for all parties in the elections between 1982 and 2002 (only 
1991 and 1994 for New Democracy). 
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Figure 5.  The voter perceived policy positions on immigration policy, environmental policy and tax 
policy on a scale between 0 and 10. The sizes of the markers are weighted according to the perceived 
importance of the policy area to each party.  
Figure 4. The average seat share by the distance to a seat change, measured in percentage points of 
the vote share, for parties with a vote share (a) under the median size (b) and over the median size. The 
width of the intervals is 0.1 percentage points. 
ba 
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Figure 6.  The point estimates for the effect on the placement of refugee immigrants 
of each party plotted against the voter assigned policy position on admitting more 
refugee immigrants to Sweden. The sizes of the markers are weighted according to the 
perceived importance of the policy area to each party.  
 
  
Figure 7. The point estimates for the effect on the environmental policy performance 
of each party plotted against the voter assigned policy position on the “green” policy 
spectrum. The sizes of the markers are weighted according to the perceived importance 
of the policy area to each party. 
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Figure 8.  The point estimates for the effect on tax rate of each party plotted against 
the voter assigned policy position on the left to right scale. The sizes of the markers are 
weighted according to the perceived importance of the policy area to each party. 
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Figure 9. The vote seat share by the distance to a seat change, measured in percentage points of the 
vote share, for parties with a vote share (a) under the median size (b) and over the median size. The 
width of the intervals is 0.1 percentage points. 
ba 
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Figure 10.  Illustration of different scenarios of vote changes leading to Party 1 gaining a seat.  a) Party 1 
increases its votes, such that C1(s1) > C2(s2-1)  b) Either Party 2 or 3 loses votes, such that C2(s2-1)  < 
C1(s1) or C3(s3-1)  < C1(s1). c) Party 1 increases its votes such that C1(s1) > C2(s2-1). d) Party 1 increases its 
votes and Party 2 loses votes such that C1(s1) > C3(s3)  and C2(s2-1)  < C1(s1). e) Party 2 and 3 lose votes 
such that C3(s3) < C1(s1) and C2(s2-1)  < C1(s1). 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics: Tax Rate 1983-2006, Placement of Refugee Immigrants 1986-2006, 
Environmental Ranking 1993-2000 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Annual data      
Tax Rate 6882 19.1 % 2.6 % 9.7 % 33.3 % 
Placement of Refugee Immigrants 5711 58.6 155.0 0 4023 
Placement of Ref. Im. / 1000 inhabitants 5711 1.9 2.5  0 0.058 
Relative environmental ranking 2494 54.7 % 18.5 % 5 % 100 % 
      
Election Period Average      
Tax Rate 2001 18.9 % 2.6 % 10.2  % 32.9 % 
Placement of Refugee Immigrants 1717 61.1 141.2 0 2426 
Placement of Ref. Im. / 1000 inhabitants 1711 2.0 1.9 0 0.025 
Relative environmental ranking 861 53.5  % 16.7 % 7.69 % 100 % 
 
Table 2. 
Notation, summary statistics 1982-2002  
Party Not Vote-Share % Left – Right Immigration Environment
  Mean St.De. Pos   Imp Pos   Imp Pos   Imp 
          
Conservative Party M 17.4 8.6 8.8 0.45 4.6 0.00 3.7 0.01 
Center Party C 14.9 8.7 5.8 0.10 5.4 0.01 6.9 0.42 
Liberal Party FP 7.7 4.0 5.8 0.15 7.1 0.05 5.0 0.01 
Christian Democrats KD 5.1 3.9 6.5 0.02 6.5 0.01 4.8 0.01 
Environmental Party MP 3.4 2.4 3.9 0.03 5.8 0.00 8.9 0.79 
Social Democrats S 40.4 9.71 3.2 0.10 6.6 0.02 5.1 0.01 
Left Party V 6.1 5.0 1.3 0.33 6.1 0.01 5.5 0.07 
New Democracy ND 0.5 1.4 7.5 0.19 1.3 0.46 3.0 0.01 
M, FP, KD & C Right 45.2 11.7       
S, V Left 46.6 11.6       
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Table 3. 
Estimated effects of seat share treatment variable on seat shares. Elections 1982-2002 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Seat Share of Party        
Conservative Party 0.59** 0.67** 0.50  0.77*** 0.87*** 0.92*** 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.51)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Identifying obs 1010 605 283  1010 605 283 
        
Center Party 0.77*** 0.64* 0.95*  0.78*** 0.87*** 0.95*** 
 (0.26) (0.35) (0.54)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Identifying obs 969 574 269  969 574 269 
        
Liberal Party 0.98*** 1.16*** 0.78***  0.80*** 0.89*** 0.95*** 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.27)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Identifying obs 888 451 202  888 451 202 
        
Christian Democrats 0.94*** 0.97*** 1.02***  0.82*** 0.92*** 0.98*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.24)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Identifying obs 851 480 219  851 480 219 
        
Environmental Party 0.92*** 1.00*** 0.89***  0.82*** 0.90*** 0.94*** 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.27)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Identifying obs 776 453 191  776 453 191 
        
Social Democrats 0.41** 0.38 0.19  0.70*** 0.74*** 0.84*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.39)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Identifying obs 1354 961 491  1354 961 491 
        
Left Party 0.84*** 0.95*** 1.57***  0.83*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.33)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Identifying obs 814 441 205  814 441 205 
        
New Democracy 0.76*** 0.50** 0.44*  0.79*** 0.87*** 0.97*** 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.27)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
Identifying obs 132 68 32  132 68 32 
        
Local Parties 0.04 -0.13 0.39  0.78*** 0.86*** 0.99*** 
 (0.36) (0.49) (0.69)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Identifying obs 365 226 98  365 226 98 
        
Vote Share Control no no no  yes yes yes 
λ = .5 % .25 % .1 %  .5 % .25 % .1 % 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in each regression is the seat share of the party. The unit of 
observation is municipality in an election and the sample period is 1982-2002. The vote share control 
function is defined as a fourth-order polynomial.  
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Table 4.  
Estimated effects of seat shares on policy outcomes 
 Refugee Immigrants  Environmental Policy  Tax rate 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9 
Spec Base 2SLS OLS  Base 2SLS OLS  Base 2SLS OLS 
Party            
Conservative Party -3.89 -6.08 0.32  1.12 1.12 -0.09  -2.20 -2.76 -0.89 
 (3.13) (4.11) (1.29)  (0.71) (0.93) (0.25)  (2.52) (3.16) (1.54) 
Center Party -3.59 -5.49 -1.21  -0.25 -0.42 0.07  -1.27 -1.42 -1.09 
 (3.38) (4.25) (1.04)  (0.82) (1.00) (0.19)  (3.50) (4.61) (0.94) 
Liberal Party 4.34 2.50 -2.24*  -0.73 -0.64 -0.13  1.05 1.25 0.34 
 (3.67) (4.38) (1.25)  (0.91) (1.04) (0.30)  (2.46) (3.19) (2.50) 
Christian Democrats -5.91* -7.43** 1.59  -0.32 -0.19 -0.12  -1.11 -1.08 -2.39 
 (3.02) (3.59) (1.42)  (0.72) (0.85) (0.31)  (3.21) (4.05) (1.71) 
Environmental Party -2.51 -4.23 0.66  1.69** 1.97** 0.10  4.23 4.67 0.22 
 (3.38) (4.11) (1.20)  (0.73) (0.85) (0.42)  (3.29) (4.24) (1.16) 
Left Party -5.83 -6.84 -0.64  -0.95 -0.99 0.15  0.73 0.44 0.89 
 (3.95) (4.47) (0.97)  (1.01) (1.06) (0.23)  (3.85) (4.45) (0.90) 
New Democracy -16.7*** -19.9*** -2.28  -1.83 -2.05 -0.37  0.04 0.76 2.79* 
 (6.06) (7.48) (1.59)  (1.31) (1.57) (0.42)  (6.96) (8.24) (1.54) 
Local Party -5.94 -8.79 1.38*  -0.21 0.02 -0.06  6.45 7.50 -0.92 
 (5.33) (6.52) (0.76)  (0.90) (1.08) (0.16)  (11.51) (13.98) (0.67) 
observations 1711 1710 1711  861 860 861  2001 2000 2001 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  λ = 
0.25% for the reduced form and 2SLS specifications. Each specification includes a fourth-order polynomial of the vote shares, 
election period and municipality fixed effects. The unit of observation is a municipality in an election period, the sample period is 
1985-2006 for refugee immigrants, 1993-2001 for environmental policy and 1982-2006 for the tax rate. The dependent variable for 
refugee immigrants is the log per capita number of placed immigrants. For environmental policy, the dependent variable is 
environmental ranking score relative to the maximal score and for the tax rate it is the municipal tax rate measured in percentage 
points. 
  
46
Table 5. 
Difference in representation effects between pairs of parties.  
 Refugee Immigrants Environmental Policy Tax rate 
 1 2  3 4  5 6 
 Gain        
Party Liberal Party 
New  
Demo 
 Environ 
Party 
Center 
Party 
 Conser 
Party 
Left 
Party 
Lose         
Conservative Party 8.2 -12.8  0.6 -1.4   2.9 
 (0.06) (0.04)  (0.58) (0.16)   (0.53) 
Center Party 7.9 -13.1  2   -0.9 2 
 (0.08) (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.84) (0.58) 
Liberal Party  -21  2.4 0.4  -3.3 -0.4 
  (0.00)  (0.05) (0.68)  (0.36) (0.94) 
Christian Democrats 10.2 -10.8  2 0  -1.1 1.8 
 (0.03) (0.09)  (0.04) (0.95)  (0.78) (0.67) 
Environmental Party 6.8 -14.2   -2  -6.4 -3.5 
 (0.16) (0.05)   (0.05)  (0.10) (0.33) 
Social Democrats 4.3 -16.7  1.7 -0.3  -2.2 (0.7 
 (0.24) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.76)  (0.38) (0.85) 
Left Party 10.1 -10.9  2.6 0.6  -2.9  
 (0.03) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.58)  (0.53)  
New Democracy 21   3.5 1.5  -2.2 0.7 
 (0.00)   (0.03) (0.29)  (0.76) (0.93) 
Local Party 10.2 -10.8  1.9 -0.1  -8.7 -5.8 
 (0.12) (0.19)  (0.08) (0.97)  (0.47) (0.59) 
The results from the baseline specification, shown in table 4, are used to construct the table. The effect of each 
party gaining a seat relative to each other party is shown in the columns, while the effect of losing a seat is 
shown in the rows. The differences that are significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold. The P-values 
from F-tests for differences in effects between pair of parties are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6. 
Estimated effects of seat shares on the placement of refugee immigrants 1986-2006, alternative specifications 
λ = 0.5%   0.25 %      0.1%  
 1 2  3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
            
Conservative Party -2.56 -1.30  -6.30 -4.12 -5.41 -3.89 -4.01  -3.48 -0.64 
 (2.61) (2.40)  (4.92) (4.41) (3.43) (3.13) (3.19)  (5.16) (4.62) 
Center Party -0.31 -0.92  -4.43 -3.97 -3.33 -3.59 -3.38  0.08 -3.25 
 (2.81) (2.51)  (5.35) (4.88) (4.03) (3.38) (3.36)  (6.30) (5.61) 
Liberal Party 0.60 0.59  5.57 6.19 3.20 4.34 4.18  10.16* 8.99 
 (2.63) (2.53)  (5.36) (4.86) (3.92) (3.67) (3.61)  (5.96) (5.87) 
Christian Democrats -2.27 -1.14  -9.3** -8.71* -5.92* -5.91* -6.24**  -8.28 -9.55** 
 (2.78) (2.49)  (4.53) (4.43) (3.54) (3.02) (3.04)  (5.79) (4.72) 
Environmental Party 0.06 -2.45  -1.90 1.57 -0.03 -2.51 -2.44  -1.96 2.53 
 (2.59) (2.37)  (5.43) (4.60) (3.89) (3.38) (3.41)  (6.78) (5.39) 
Left Party -2.98 -1.70  -9.62* -8.68* -11.8*** -5.83 -5.83  -8.93 -2.53 
 (2.85) (2.69)  (5.73) (4.89) (4.00) (3.95) (3.93)  (5.81) (5.67) 
New Democracy -8.61 -9.64**  -13.1 -14.1 -18.8** -16.7*** -16.9***  -9.72 -13.4** 
 (6.25) (4.46)  (10.2) (11.57) (8.41) (6.06) (6.01)  (6.18) (6.41) 
Local Party -9.23** -7.09*  -16.7** -14.9** -7.00 -5.94 -6.23  0.29 2.11 
 (4.45) (3.71)  (8.29) (7.37) (6.47) (5.33) (5.38)  (8.57) (7.79) 
Vote Share Control yes yes  no yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Election Period F.E yes yes  no no yes yes yes  yes yes 
Municipality F.E  no yes  no no no yes yes  no yes 
Control Varaibles no no  no no no no yes  no no 
observations 1711 1711  1711 1711 1711 1711 1711  1711 1711 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
dependent variable is the log of the number of placed immigrants per capita. The unit of observation is a municipality in an election 
period and the sample period is 1985-2006. 
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Table 7. 
Estimated effects of seat shares on environmental policy performance 1993-2001 
λ = 0.5%   0.25 %      0.1%  
 1 2  3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
            
Conservative Party 0.43 0.62  0.38 1.07 1.03 1.12 1.32*  2.47* 2.82*** 
 (0.62) (0.53)  (0.89) (0.84) (0.82) (0.71) (0.71)  (1.29) (1.06) 
Center Party 0.37 0.10  0.70 0.77 0.48 -0.25 -0.27  1.06 1.73 
 (0.65) (0.55)  (0.98) (0.95) (0.93) (0.82) (0.83)  (1.54) (1.33) 
Liberal Party -0.01 -0.35  0.96 1.65 1.43 -0.73 -0.75  0.92 1.33 
 (0.67) (0.60)  (1.02) (1.01) (1.02) (0.91) (0.92)  (1.67) (1.36) 
Christian Democrats -0.44 -0.10  -1.23 -0.61 -0.58 -0.32 -0.49  -0.48 -0.46 
 (0.58) (0.52)  (0.97) (0.91) (0.91) (0.72) (0.72)  (1.27) (1.16) 
Environmental Party 0.73 0.69  2.47*** 2.18** 1.88** 1.69** 1.64**  0.66 1.60 
 (0.66) (0.60)  (0.92) (0.85) (0.82) (0.73) (0.74)  (1.26) (1.16) 
Left Party -1.13 -0.34  -0.78 -1.27 -1.11 -0.95 -0.83  0.67 1.40 
 (0.75) (0.63)  (1.06) (1.02) (1.00) (1.01) (1.00)  (1.62) (1.44) 
New Democracy -0.93 -1.61  -0.23 -0.02 -0.05 -1.83 -1.72  -1.30 -0.11 
 (1.35) (1.03)  (1.95) (1.90) (1.86) (1.31) (1.34)  (2.71) (2.00) 
Local Party -0.87 -0.52  -0.76 -0.69 -0.61 -0.21 -0.08  -0.72 -0.38 
 (0.94) (0.81)  (1.33) (1.28) (1.24) (0.90) (0.88)  (1.42) (1.42) 
Vote Share Control yes yes  no yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Election Period F.E yes yes  no no yes yes yes  yes yes 
Municipality F.E  no yes  no no no yes yes  no yes 
Control Varaibles no no  no no no no yes  no no 
observations 858 858  858 858 858 858 858  858 858 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
dependent variable is the score in the environmental ranking relative to the maximal score. The unit of observation is a municipality in 
an election period, the sample period is 1993-2001. 
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Table 8. 
Estimated effects of seat shares on the tax rate 1983-2006  
λ = 0.5%   0.25 %      0.1%  
 1 2  3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
            
Conservative Party -3.23 -2.50  -5.28 -5.99 -2.07 -2.20 -2.60  -7.69 -8.63* 
 (3.26) (2.40)  (10.39) (7.72) (5.80) (2.52) (2.52)  (9.45) (4.79) 
Center Party -0.84 -0.73  5.20 1.64 1.31 -1.27 -1.50  -6.91 -4.48 
 (2.66) (1.86)  (10.83) (7.65) (4.59) (3.50) (3.34)  (8.16) (4.31) 
Liberal Party -0.60 0.25  -9.50 -3.64 3.24 1.05 0.64  8.74 2.60 
 (4.30) (1.78)  (11.48) (8.40) (6.05) (2.46) (2.49)  (9.18) (5.28) 
Christian Democrats -2.30 -2.05  4.89 0.68 -4.48 -1.11 -0.74  -4.15 -5.64 
 (3.24) (2.16)  (9.87) (7.66) (3.59) (3.21) (3.06)  (6.90) (4.38) 
Environmental Party 1.07 5.04***  -9.30 -5.32 3.93 4.23 3.25  -1.96 2.64 
 (2.47) (1.83)  (10.93) (8.39) (5.91) (3.29) (2.82)  (7.25) (4.78) 
Left Party 11.18** 2.09  12.94 2.78 8.30 0.73 -0.11  4.82 -1.74 
 (5.45) (2.38)  (12.30) (9.13) (6.53) (3.85) (3.06)  (10.54) (5.40) 
New Democracy -4.98 4.48  1.47 -15.04 -0.50 0.04 -1.61  3.77 2.12 
 (9.10) (5.21)  (14.16) (14.53) (10.79) (6.96) (7.05)  (13.84) (8.74) 
Local Party -0.82 2.24  13.19 22.1** -0.72 6.45 5.37  3.38 13.64 
 (4.98) (6.42)  (15.79) (10.45) (7.62) (11.51) (10.15)  (12.17) (15.55) 
Vote Share Control yes yes  no yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Election Period F.E yes yes  no no yes yes yes  yes yes 
Municipality F.E  no yes  no no no yes yes  no yes 
Control Variables no no  no no no no yes  no no 
observations 2001 2001  2001 2001 2001 2001 1994  2001 2001 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
dependent variable is the municipal tax rate measured in percentage points. The unit of observation is a municipality in an election period, 
the sample period is 1985-2006 for refugee immigrants, 1993-2001 for environmental policy and 1982-2006 for the tax rate.  
50
Table 9. 
Robustness check, Estimated effects of seat shares on real income, education, share of children and population.  
Party Real Income  Education  Share of Children Population 
            
Conservative Party -67.8* -9.8  -1.4 0.5  -1.9 1.9  -0.67 -0.32* 
 (38.9) (16.7)  (9.6) (3.4)  (6.9) (2.7)  (2.54) (0.17) 
Center Party -8.2 23.2  -4.1 1.7  -9.4 0.3  -1.25 0.34 
 (42.7) (14.7)  (9.1) (3.2)  (6.2) (3.1)  (2.41) (0.22) 
Liberal Party -71.7 -6.1  -14.1* -5.3  -3.3 1.0  3.61 -0.18 
 (44.6) (17.1)  (8.2) (4.1)  (7.3) (3.1)  (2.75) (0.21) 
Christian Democrats -41.1 12.3  -3.5 4.4  -11.4* -0.7  0.78 0.15 
 (43.2) (15.5)  (8.4) (3.4)  (6.4) (3.3)  (2.41) (0.20) 
Environmental Party -64.2* 6.8  0.5 -0.0  -3.6 -2.4  -2.45 -0.21 
 (37.3) (12.9)  (7.8) (3.1)  (7.7) (3.1)  (2.64) (0.18) 
Left Party -53.9 30.8  -13.9 1.3  -5.9 -1.6  -0.43 0.03 
 (42.8) (23.2)  (10.7) (4.2)  (7.5) (3.7)  (2.96) (0.20) 
New Democracy 57.4 -8.3  12.4 -4.8  -4.5 -1.6  6.47 -0.37 
 (75.1) (25.6)  (15.6) (4.3)  (15.7) (6.0)  (6.20) (0.30) 
Local Party 13.3 -10.0  3.5 7.5  3.8 5.6  -6.48 0.52 
 (76.6) (22.3)  (14.2) (6.4)  (10.9) (4.6)  (4.08) (0.32) 
Mun.FE. no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Observations 1429 1429  1994 1994  1994 1994  1994 1994 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. λ 
= 0.25%. Each specification includes election period fixed effects and a fourth-order polynomial of the vote shares. The unit of 
observation is the municipality average in an election period and the sample period is 1982-2006 for all outcomes except real 
income, for which it is 1988-2006. The dependent variable for real income is income per capita measured in thousands of SEK in  
1990 prices. For population and share, it is defined as the share of the population with tertiary education and younger than 15 years, 
respectively. The dependent variable for population is defined as the log of the municipal population. 
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Table 10. 
Heterogeneous representation effects with respect to winning the first seat. 
   1  2  3 
 Treatment Variable 
Share of 
Observation 
Refugee 
Immigrants  
Environmental  
Policy  
Tax  
rate 
        
Conservative Party Seat Share 99% -2.84  1.23  -2.53 
   (3.22)  (0.76)  (2.65) 
 First Seat 1% -120***  0.00  -13.84 
   (28.1)  (0.00)  (32.38) 
Center Party Seat Share 97% -2.49  -0.28  -1.25 
   (3.38)  (0.86)  (3.72) 
 First Seat 3% -31.04  7.48  -18.96 
   (21.27)  (5.52)  (13.30) 
Liberal Party Seat Share 94% 3.81  -0.92  -1.34 
   (3.79)  (0.95)  (2.76) 
 First Seat 6% -35.2  0.03  31.84* 
   (33.2)  (7.60)  (17.00) 
Christian Democrats Seat Share 72% -2.13  -0.91  0.68 
   (3.71)  (0.86)  (4.02) 
 First Seat 28% -9.63  2.92*  -5.11 
   (8.55)  (1.76)  (6.39) 
Environmental Party Seat Share 70% -3.58  2.44**  4.05 
   (3.93)  (0.94)  (3.52) 
 First Seat 30% -2.33  -6.11***  -1.71 
   (6.84)  (2.04)  (5.25) 
Left Party Seat Share 87% -7.14*  -1.57  1.72 
   (4.33)  (1.04)  (4.51) 
 First Seat 13% 15.99*  4.92**  -5.53 
   (9.66)  (2.27)  (8.13) 
New Democracy Seat Share 43% -22.00  -1.07  -5.37 
   (13.74)  (1.98)  (12.50) 
 First Seat 57% 12.86  -4.55  13.01 
   (15.99)  (2.80)  (16.58) 
Local parties Seat Share 85% -4.56  -0.49  12.39 
   (6.07)  (1.05)  (12.26) 
 First Seat 15% 18.05  1.05  -36.89 
   (16.88)  (5.33)  (32.57) 
Observations   1711  861  2001 
Robust standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  d = 0.25%. The treatment variable labeled seat share is the seat share treatment variable from the 
baseline specification. The treatment variable labeled first seat is the dummy for being close to the threshold for the 
first seat interacted with the seat share treatment variable. Each specification includes a fourth-order polynomial of 
the vote shares, dummy variables for each party being close to the threshold for the first seat, election period and 
municipality fixed effects. The unit of observation is a municipality in an election period, the sample period is 1985-
2006 for refugee immigrants, 1993-2001 for environmental policy and 1982-2006 for the tax rate.  
52
Table 11. 
Election Data from Sigtuna 1991. 
Party  Cons.  Cent. Lib. Chr.  Env. Soc. Left N. D. Local 
          
Vote Share % 31.24 6.21 9.59 3.71 3.04 36.64 2.96 4.79 3.11 
Seats 15.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 18.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Seat Share % 3.61 6.12 1.20 4.08 2.04 36.73 2.04 4.08 4.08 
Dis gain ind % .92 1.05 1.82 1.47 .08 1.75 .16 .40 2.07 
Dis gain all % .10 .95 1.62 1.42 .08 .75 .16 .35 2.02 
Dis lose ind % 1.88 1.15 .48 .68 1.62 1.21 1.54 1.75 .08 
Note:. "Dis gain ind" and "Dis lose ind" is the distance to a threshold measured in the individual parties’ votes. 
"Dis gain all" and "Dis lose all" are the distance to a threshold measured in percentage points. The distance 
measure is in bold if the party is within .25% of a threshold. 
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